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Sometime around 2008 Helgeland Kraft AS, a public hydropower company 
owned by 14 municipalities in the Nordland county of Norway, had an idea: 
to build aesthetically pleasing and environmentally sound power genera-
tion stations. The power stations would service the energy needs of their 
communities, sustainably, while their beauty would inspire others to come 
and learn about clean energy. This too would contribute to Norway’s com-
mitment to become carbon neutral by 2030. The initiative is an example 
of what is possible through public–public collaboration. While Helgeland 
Kraft kicked off construction in 2014, it was in 2016 that the Nordic Invest-
ment Bank (NIB), a public bank, provided the extra financing needed for 
completion. Six new public, energy-efficient hydropower plants would be 
backed by a 15-year, €49.5 million loan. The NIB granted the loan because 
the energy project met its publicly mandated criteria for mitigating climate 
change, reducing pollution and contributing to local development. 
The Ovre Forsland power plant in Leirfjord, Norway. Credit: Innovation-
Norway, Flickr, Licence CC BY-NC 2.0
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The point here is neither to promote hydropower as environmentally 
unproblematic nor to suggest public banks are a financial cure-all. No. 
Rather, the point is that through public–public collaborations communities 
can realize the future they want on their own terms. Public banks can play 
a vital role in that future.
Indeed, as this chapter shows, public banks are enjoying a contemporary 
renaissance of sorts. Two conjunctural reasons help to explain why. First, 
the 2008-09 global financial crisis exposed the excesses of private finance 
and the poverty of neoliberal financialization strategies for development, 
while reaffirming that public banks can be a stabilizing force amidst eco-
nomic instability. Second, to varying degrees critical scholars and develop-
ment organizations, alongside global civil society, are frustrated with the 
failures of private finance to support a sustainable and just transition to a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient future. Both events have pushed public banks 
to the fore of the ‘finance for development’ debate, especially in relation to 
the new United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Here I focus 
on the potential of public banks to finance the sustainable future we want – 
a potentiality that will only be realized if struggled for. 
What is now occurring in the area of ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’ finance is in 
many ways contrary to the letter of neoliberalism. Public bank funding 
is increasingly regarded by international development and financial 
institutions not as corrosive but as catalytic for the future of low-carbon 
infrastructure investments. This is something new. Yet the spirit of 
neoliberalism (i.e. the subordination of state, workers and society to the 
needs of private accumulation) remains very much alive. This spirit remains 
the same within these international institutions. Where private investors 
are unwilling to ‘risk’ their capital to invest in climate mitigation strategies 
and green infrastructure, then public banks should step in to de-risk private 
investments. The logic is that public support will help to leverage or draw 
in available pools of private finance. Private finance sees the investment as 
attractive because it has public backing, which increases the likelihood of 
higher returns. The overarching ‘new’ neoliberal narrative is that only by 
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using public resources to mobilize private finance can we begin to raise the 
financial resources needed to tackle climate change. In short, public banks 
should socialize private risks to confront climate change. Or so the new 
neoliberal story goes. 
Another future for public banks is not only desirable but possible. I argue 
that public banks have the potential to finance the transition to a sustain-
able and equitable future in the public, not private, interest. Two premises 
support my argument. First, I show that the existing financial capacity of 
public banks far exceeds the inaccurate and misleading estimates provided 
by the international development community. That is, public banks have 
sufficient resources to take the lead in tackling the estimated $90 tril-
lion in climate infrastructure investments needed – without first bending 
a knee to the profitability needs of private financiers. Second, I summarize 
the benefits of having a public bank, whose public policy functions can 
help maximize the efficacy of tackling climate change in the public interest. 
I conclude by pointing to the centrality of social struggle in determining the 
future orientation of public banking. To have public banks serve the public 
good, we must demand it.
The financial capacity of public banks
For neoliberal advocates and institutions such as the World Bank and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
actually existing financial capacity of public banks is of little interest. 
They already know that private bankers and financiers are the only viable, 
indeed preferable, solution for financing a low-carbon future. Could it be 
otherwise? Their official publications reinforce such neoliberal common-
sense assumptions – but only by misrepresenting real public bank capacity. 
Take for example the World Bank’s inaugural Global Financial Development 
Report 2013: Rethinking the role of the state in finance, which is written in 
response to the role played by public banks during the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis. The report states that public banks ‘account for less than 10 
percent of banking system assets in developed economies and double that 
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share in developing economies’ and it provides an estimate of only $2 trillion 
worth of assets held by public development banks (which comes nowhere 
near what these percentages would actually represent). For a report on the 
‘state’ in finance, it is remarkable that no further details, no global numbers, 
and no accurate empirical sense of the public banking sector is given at 
all. A 2017 International Monetary Fund working paper on bank ownership 
fairs no better, recycling 2010 World Bank data to claim that public banks 
account for roughly 18 per cent of all banking assets in developing countries 
and 12 per cent in high income countries, but they too give no concrete 
indication of total numbers or combined public bank assets. One is simply 
left guessing. A contemporary OECD publication on climate finance has its 
own limitations. Setting aside concern for overall public bank control, the 
report focuses on public development banks. By its account, there are ‘more 
than 250’ such banks with assets of about $5 trillion. This would seem 
more realistic, but in fact it is still far from the mark. Yet today’s most 
important international body responsible for informing policy on finance for 
sustainable development (vis-à-vis the SDGs), the UN Inter-Agency Task 
Force on Financing for Development (IATF), reproduces this same figure. 
The IATF goes on to privilege public–private partnerships and advocate that 
public banks primarily support private investors.
Anyone interested in climate finance and wanting to understand the 
financing options available would be forgiven for thinking that public banks 
are not and could not be serious financial agents of change. What can $5 
trillion do when we need $90 trillion? 
Yet actually existing public banking capacity is far greater than what is 
commonly (mis)represented by the international development community. 
And this data on public banks, as it turns out, is not too hard to come 
by. Researchers can access information by using the Orbis Bankscope 
(Bureau VanDijk) online database, which specializes in banks and finance. 
Additionally, the annual Global Public Investor report by the Official Monetary 
and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) provides information on public 
pension funds, sovereign investors and central banks.
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Interpreting the data, however, requires some clarification. My focus is on 
public banks and bank-like financial institutions. Here a bank is considered 
as ‘public’ if it satisfies one or more of the following conditions: it is guided 
by a public mandate, governed under public law and/or publicly owned by 
state authorities or other public sector entities. In many cases, all three 
apply. In terms of ownership, I use a figure of 50.01 per cent plus as consti-
tuting legal public ownership.
There too are different specializations of public financial institutions. Table 
1 includes public banks, multi-laterals, pension and sovereign funds, and 
central banks (whose differences are not elaborated on here) to illustrate 
their institutional numbers and vast public financial resources. 
Based on Orbis data, there are 693 public banks around the world. These 
banks control $37.72 trillion in assets, which is equivalent to 48 per cent 
of global GDP. Comparably, this constitutes 20 per cent of all banks, public 
and private.10 This is a far cry from what is typically represented.
Categories
Public banks and bank-like 
institutions8 
Public banks (excluding China’s 
15 largest banks)
Public banks plus multi-laterals9 
Public banks plus multi-laterals 
(excluding China’s largest banks) 
Public banks plus multi-laterals 
plus pension & sovereign funds
Public banks plus multi-laterals 
plus pension & sovereign funds 
plus central banks
Number of 
institutions
693
678
757
742
1,342
1,507
Combined assets
($ trillion)
37.7
17
40.3
19.6
61.5
73.8
% of global GDP
(2017)*
48
22
51
25
78
93
Sources: Orbis 2018; OMFIF 2017.  
* Estimated gross domestic product (GDP) set at $79 trillion for 2017.
Table 1. Public financial institutions: numbers and assets, 2017-18
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There are other measures of public banks worth considering. One is the 
elephant in the room, China, which has 11 of the world’s largest 15 public 
banks that control assets totalling $20.6 trillion. Excluding these public 
giants, total global public banking assets come to just over $17 trillion 
(Table 1). The other public banks in the top 15 include Germany’s KfW Group 
($567 billion in assets); the State Bank of India ($531 billion); and the failed 
private banks but then state-rescued Royal Bank of Scotland ($981 billion) 
and The Netherlands’ ABN AMRO ($943 billion). Other globally significant 
public banks include Russia’s Sberbank ($471 billion); Italy’s Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti ($433 billion); and Banco do Brasil ($409 billion). 
It is also worth noting that the public multi-lateral banks, of which there 
are 66 and which command the better part of the international devel-
opment community’s reporting attention, have a comparatively modest 
amount of assets at about $2.6 trillion. When combined, public banks plus 
multi-lateral banks control over $40 trillion in assets. 
Finally, it is interesting to reference the most expansive category of pub-
lic banks, which includes multi-laterals, pension and sovereign funds, and 
central banks. These 1,507 public financial institutions have assets nearing 
$74 trillion, equivalent to 93 per cent of global GDP.
The point being that actual public financial institutional capacity, even by 
a relatively conservative measure of $38 trillion worth of just public bank 
assets, far outstrips anything represented in the UN system and OECD lit-
erature. There is, in fact, massive actually existing public financial capacity. 
The neoliberal myth of public financial incapacity is most striking within the 
debate on financing low-carbon infrastructure. 
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THE POTENTIAL OF PUBLIC BANKING 
FOR PUBLIC SERVICES AND A JUST TRANSITION 
$2-5 
trillion
PUBLIC BANKS
Myt
h
Rea
lity
PUBLIC BANKS
$37 
trillion
CENTRAL BANKS  
+ MULILATERALS +
PENSION- AND SOVEREIGN FUNDS 
$73 trillion
$36 
trillion
93% 
GLOBAL GDP
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According to the 2016 Delivering on Sustainable Infrastructure for Better De-
velopment and Better Climate report, infrastructure accounts for more than 
60 per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions.11 Moreover, the permanence 
of infrastructure locks in such emissions often for decades. However, the 
financing of this new, needed low-carbon infrastructure is costly, risky and 
long term. As the slogan now goes, we need to turn climate investment 
from ‘billions into trillions’.12 But how to do it?
Estimates of the total investment needed vary, but it is largely thought 
that from 2015 to 2030 global society will need to spend about $90 trillion 
to meet our climate mitigation ambitions. This total investment exceeds 
the combined total of all current infrastructure stock. This means global 
low-carbon public and private investments need to increase from roughly 
$3.4 trillion to over $6 trillion annually.13
Herein lies the rub. If you are led to believe that public banks control at 
best $5 trillion in total assets, then raising $6 trillion annually seems 
insurmountable. You would obviously need to tap private markets. But, if 
you understood that public banks alone have closer to $38 trillion in assets 
then the realm of the possible is radically different. Suddenly, public rather 
than private interests can be the catalytic force in financing a low-carbon 
transition. We can actively bank on the sustainable and equitable future we 
want, bypassing the need to subordinate climate justice to financialized, 
private and profit-making imperatives. This suggests that the potential 
of public banking should be at the centre of debate and climate-action 
strategies.
The potential benefits of public banking
Over the last five years or so the potential public benefits of owning and 
controlling a public bank have slowly begun to be rediscovered by civil 
society, policy-makers and academics interested in alternatives to private 
finance, and indeed neoliberalism. The reasons are diverse but often revolve 
around public banks being able to, potentially, serve the public interest 
159
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
w
e
 
w
a
n
t
(such as a just energy transition) rather than private interests and profit 
motives.
For example, a 2017 report by the European Network on Debt and 
Development (Eurodad, a network of 47 civil society organizations from 
20 countries) surveyed the literature and consulted their global partners 
on public banking.14 The subsequent report highlights some key benefits of 
public banks, which as matter of public policy, can:
•  Direct finance to priority economic sectors and geographic regions;
•  Build the financial sector, by filling gaps in the credit supply or demand 
 left open by the private sector;
• Promote economic stability, by playing a counter-cyclical lending role at 
 times of economic instability;
• Improve financial standards, by insisting on social, environmental or 
 human rights safeguards.
The ability of public banks to direct, build, promote and improve finance 
contributed to the UN highlighting their sustainable development potential. 
Notably, the final report of the 2015 Financing for Development Conference 
in Addis Ababa pointed out that public development banks should play a 
key role in reaching the SDGs. Working from the resultant ‘Action Agenda’, 
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has argued that 
public banks could in fact do much more to scale up their often-conservative 
loan-to-equity ratios.15 That is, their lending portfolio could be extended 
well beyond their current $38 trillion in assets. 
This capacity is not neutral, however. Those wanting to ensure a just cli-
mate transition – for workers, women, the poor and marginalized – need 
to forefront public interest, sustainability and equity concerns in ways 
that directly confront and contest, for example, World Bank approaches 
(‘Maximizing Finance for Development’16) that fundamentally serve to 
further the private accumulation of capital over any public or common good.
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There are concrete ways public banks can confront neoliberal developmen-
talism and, by extension, support a just future.17 Public banks can offer a 
source of public revenue that can be used to cross-subsidize public projects 
and programmes. In addition to privileging green development strategies, 
public banks can commit to gender justice – as Costa Rica’s Banco Popular y 
de Desarrollo Comunal has explicitly done. 
By developing their own institutional capacities, public banks can contribute 
to overall public sector expertise and independence from ‘market’ forces 
as illustrated by Germany’s KfW, created in the wake of World War II. Add 
to this that public banks can function at the heart of willing public sector 
coalitions interested in fulfilling policy priorities, notably on infrastructure, 
as the Nordic Investment Bank has done. In building such domestic public 
financial capacity and knowledge, public banks can work as a countervailing 
political force against the dominance of private (often foreign) banks over 
public policy formation and implementation. To this, for better or worse, 
China’s public banks are a testament. This rationale for domestic public 
banking capacity informed post-war nationalizations in places as diverse as 
Cuba, India and Vietnam as well as public bank creations in Canada, the US 
and Turkey, to name but a few examples. 
A worker smiles at the camera while installing solar roof panels in 
Shanghai, China. Credit: Jiri Rezac, The Climate Group, Flickr, Licence 
CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
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Today, it remains the case that public banks can operate indefinitely 
without a profit-maximization imperative if given a public mandate to 
do so. This can help to minimize the effect of hyper-competitive global 
financial imperatives on society. It can also reduce the cost of borrowing for 
priority sectors. This helps us make sense of why public banks are emerging 
as central actors in the sustainable finance agenda. But more must be done 
to maximize the potential of public banks to work in the public interest.
It would be a mistake to believe that just states, policymakers or even 
academics see the benefits of public banking. Ordinary people see it too. In 
smaller communities a public bank may be the only bank offering financial 
services and credit support, as is the case of Ziraat Bank in Turkey and of 
Caixa Econômica Federal in Brazil. The same scenario exists with the world’s 
newest public banks, the Territorial Bank of American Samoa, which filled 
the vacuum left by the private Bank of Hawaii after it withdrew from the 
island, and is now a fully functioning public retail bank operating under the 
motto of Faletupe o le Atunu’u (the People’s Bank).
Perhaps even more remarkable is the rise of a strong public banking social 
movement across the US.18 From Los Angeles to New York, New Jersey to 
Oakland, bottom-up popular responses to the failures of Wall Street banks 
to provide for communities have pushed governing authorities to rethink 
the potential of public banks.19 In recent years a number of municipal and 
state governments have commissioned economic feasibility studies, all of 
which have demonstrated the viability and desirability of public banks for 
local budgets and development.20 Social movements have picked up on the 
conclusions. For example, the ‘Public Bank LA’ movement – formed out 
of the California Public Banking Alliance, itself supported by the nation-
wide Public Banking Institute – has emerged with a mandate to help 
establish a socially and environmentally chartered municipal ‘Public Bank 
of Los Angeles’.21 Reflecting the known benefits of public banks, the Public 
Bank LA movement lists the five most relevant to them: 1) save money; 
2) community development; 3) ethical allocation of money; 4) local self-
determination; and 5) serve the unbanked and the underbanked. Far from 
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utopian, such public banking principles inform the mandates of public 
banks, past and present.22 The formidable German public banking sector, for 
example, explicitly explains its raison d’être as ‘acting in the public interest’ 
as opposed to profit maximization.23
The struggle for banking publicly
Banking publicly is to bank in the public interest, which in itself is a matter 
of contestation and social struggle involving crosscutting issues of class, 
gender, culture, race and ecology. There is, therefore, nothing easy about 
banking publicly on the future we want. For this reason, the placement of 
social struggle before any notion of a ‘public’ bank is necessary. Public banks 
will have troubles, which are generated within societies and are as much 
political and social as they are economic, and they are not beyond critical 
assessment, transparent accountability and self-reflective improvement 
for the mere fact that they are public. To suggest otherwise leads to 
dogmatism. Where public banks are abused for personal or political gain, 
this must be confronted and offenders held to account. If public banks fail 
to perform according to their mandates, open reviews of their operations 
need to inform change. To be sure, neoliberal detractors of public banks 
will say this is all very well but that the truth of the matter is public banks 
are inherently inefficient and prone to corruption, and that they ultimately 
undermine development.24 Privatization is the preferred course of action 
since private banks are economically superior (read: profitable). Research 
shows this not to be the case.25 History, too, points to the credibility of 
public banking in ways that can support a more progressive public ethos 
without having to prioritize profitability above all else.26 
To emphasize the point, though, it is the social context, the social struggle 
to reclaim public banks in the public interest, that will define their future 
viability – not merely whether a bank is publicly owned or not.
Yet, more than any other public financial institution, public banks have 
been under- and misrepresented by the international development com-
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munity. As importantly, critics of neoliberalism have failed to appreciate 
public banks as a strategic location of social struggle. Communities can 
make a difference over the content of public banks’ operations more di-
rectly than, say, over the operations of the multi-laterals or even central 
banks. Exerting popular control over public banks in the common interest 
may offer one of our best hopes of breaking with neoliberal strategies of 
development. Public banks deserve our future attention.
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